Police cleaning up the death of Feijao after his assassination on 3/26/2012

On Monday, March 26, 2012 the president of one of Rocinha’s three residents associations (AMABB) was shot and killed. Vanderlan Barros de Oliveira, known as Feijão, walked a short distance out of the association’s headquarters when he was shot at five times in broad day light by a man on a motorcycle wearing a helmet. Three of the bullets hit him, two in the back and one in the neck. He died almost immediately. Vanderlan, who was 41 years old, left behind 4 children, including a new born baby girl.

His assassination follows a week in which residents of Rocinha living in the vicinity of Rua 1, Terreirão, Rua 2, Macega, Valão and Roupa Suja heard the sound of gunfire for 3 nights in a row. The relative ‘sense’ of stability brought on during the change of power, from the heavily armed drug traffickers to the state sponsored UPP, or Pacifying Police Units, is proving much shakier than many had anticipated – in fairness Rio’s state police insist that they always expected this to be a challenging process (Beltrame: é ingênuo achar que não haverá problemas em ocupação). Another recent report stated that Rocinha is going through a period of ‘re-stabilization’. (Rocinha passa por fase de estabilização, diz especialista ) Did anyone really believe that deeply entrenched drug traffickers would concede so easily, or that the associated subculture of gang life, violence and corruption would disappear overnight? Knowing that the invasion of the police in November of 2011 was imminent most of the traffickers fled to other favelas in Rio de Janeiro that are controlled by the same criminal faction. After the dust began to settle, not long after the New Year, many of them started returning to Rocinha, little by little. Now, in March 2012, the police admit that there has been an increase in the number of Rocinha’s drug points (Polícia investiga aumento de bocas de fumo na Rocinha. Traficante Canelão está de volta).
The specifics are complex and seem to be changing weekly, but in a nutshell, (we will leave most real names out since we and our families live here in Rocinha) a once high-ranking general in Rocinha’s drug faction who fled the community after an internal power struggle erupted in 2008, has recently been seen roaming the community’s becos. Increasingly bodies are surfacing as a result of the internal power struggle occurring, as two of Brazil’s largest gangs fight for control of Rocinha’s lucrative drug trade, the most valuable in the city. Now with the murder of Vanderlan, who was widely considered to be corrupt and even violent, the power dynamics in Rocinha are taking another significant turn. It appears that the gangster who recently returned to Rocinha to take control of his rival’s drug points, along with his loyal soldiers, find the current police presence less of a threat than that of Rocinha’s recently arrested drug kingpin and his army, presented. As Rio politics and crime blogger Ricardo Gama exclaimed, “What kind of occupation is this…what kind of pacification is this?” (Ricardo Gama’s Blog)

In the beginning many of Rocinha’s residents cooperated with the police after the initial invasion and occupation in November, but this is becoming increasingly uncommon. At that time there was general feeling of excitement and positivity in Rocinha regarding the supposed power shift. (Listen to a radio podcast - Favela Pacified – BBC) During the first two months of the occupation there were dozens of arrests, with many made possible because of residents collaborating with the police. Not anymore. Now, most residents are dead silent. Widespread rumors suggest that some of the residents who worked with the police, particularly those who appeared on TV or in the papers, have been killed. There is an increased sense of insecurity, once again, in Rocinha.

So where are the police, what are they actually doing all day and night in Rocinha? Wasn’t the plan to create a general sense of security and protection and noticeable improvements in quality of life? Conceivably this could be the very long term goal. Or perhaps the real object was not to pacify Rocinha but rather to rid it of machine guns, assault rifles and other heavy arms. Indeed, the AKs, Uzis and grenade launchers that so absurdly defined daily life in Rocinha have vanished. This is very good for Rio’s political economic elites and stakeholders interested in redefining the city for tourists and investors in light of the upcoming World Cup and Olympics. Is this the true rationale behind Rocinha’s police invasion, and indeed the entire UPP process?

One thing is certain the police have only been patrolling the main road of Estrada da Gávea and a few others streets in Rocinha that are navigable by cars and other police vehicles. They very rarely enter the hundreds of becos (alleyways) that wind their way through Rocinha. Distinct even among favelas, the police pacification of Rocinha faces the extra challenge of the community’s difficulty to patrol infrastructure (or-lack-there-of) and topography (Rocinha recebe segundo reforço no policiamento em menos de uma semana). According to a recent report (Rocinha: Plano de Desenvolvimento Sustentável 2010) only 10% of the community’s population live in areas that are accessible by cars or police vehicles (PAC 2010). Before Rocinha’s kingpin was arrested last November the traffickers had hundreds of foot soldiers policing the streets and alleyways 24/7. This was an intimidating and unhealthy scenario but their daunting presence did guarantee a relative degree of peace (or more appropriately ‘false-peace’) than what the police are currently providing.

…despite the move to ‘pacify’ this huge favela, corruption (police – traffickers – resident’s associations – outside politicians/politics) has remained largely unchanged.

Why aren’t the police entering Rocinha becos and vielas? Our opinion is that despite the move to ‘pacify’ this huge favela, corruption (police – traffickers – resident’s associations – outside politicians/politics) has remained largely unchanged. Several reliable sources indicate that drug traffickers continue dealing large amounts of marijuana and cocaine, and that they continue to bribe police so they do not interfere. In one case, a busy and visible drug point has been operating adjacent to one of Rocinha’s newly constructed public buildings that built with funds stemming from a well known government slum upgrading program – the drug point is only a few dozen meters from a 24/7 police point.

What makes Rio deserve such distinctions?

In a slight change of direction it is important to note that Rio is a unique city, in numerous enviable ways, from its renowned geography and warm climate to its vibrant culture and enthralling sports (actually just soccer/football). Rio is also famous for some unattractive characteristics. For one, there are few cities in the world where socioeconomic inequality is so glaringly ‘in-your-face’. Hundreds of cities in Latin America, Africa and Asia are home to poverty (slums) as well as opulence (McMansions, gated communities and condominiums). In only a handful of cities, however, will one encounter examples like the northeastern border of Rocinha which is only meters (maybe 35 feet) from the mansions of one of Rio’s most affluent gated communities (i.e. Rua Sérgio Porto and Rua Caio Mário) in Alto Gávea (see photo).

The border between the affluent neighborhood of Alta Gavea and the low income community of Rocinha

Secondly and more important for the topic at hand is the fact that even fewer cities in the world have slums or low-income neighborhoods located in central (financially important) areas of the city where young men openly patrol the streets and alleyways armed to their teeth with weapons manufactured for war. Of course this description excludes cities that are actually experiencing some form of official war or political, cultural or religious insurgency; such as areas of urban Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Syria. One urban area where a comparable scenario of heavily armed youths could be found was in the comunas (slums) of Medellin during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Acero Velasquez 2009), but even then there were notable differences. In Colombia the FARC and ELN, which are self declared “peasant armies” have been engaged in guerilla war with Colombia’s government for decades, and the comunas, especially of Medellin and Cali, were strategic urban points for what otherwise is a rural war over agrarian reform and political economic ideology. The drug factions that still control hundreds of Rio’s favelas share some resemblance to an urban street gang adaptation of armed rebel groups that are common in many areas of central Africa or Colombia, but they lack any coherent ideology. Rio de Janeiro social geographer Marcelo Lopes de Souza has suggested that a more appropriate description of Rio’s favela drug factions is that they are more like “micro-level warlords” (2009) that asset control over strategic low-income urban areas in a process that he terms “territorialization”.

Marcelo Lopes de Souza points out that Rio de Janeiro's "drug trafficking comandos" are "more organized and better armed than the word ‘gang’ could suggest."

The visual shock and intensity of Rio’s micro-level warlords has lead to markedly high homicide rates and striking displays of violence since the 1980s. The sheer size of the guns the young men are armed with and the impressive number of foot soldiers patrolling the favelas has been the subject of dozens of movies and documentaries in the last 15 years alone. However, these unique attributes are not necessarily correlated to higher homicide rates. In Recife and Maceio, for example, two sigificantly smaller northeastern coastal cities, the homicide rates are considerably higher than in than in Rio, and have been for years, in particular Recife. Pernambuco, the state Recife is the capital of, has implemented a public security program inspired and guided by PRONASCI that has been in place for 5 years and which many specialists claim is more comprehensive and proving more effective than Rio’s UPP initiative. The program is called Pacto Pela Vida (http://www.pactopelavida.pe.gov.br/), and it has resulted in a significant reduction not only Recife’s but all of Pernambuco’s homicide rates.

Recife and Maceio are also cities with hundreds of favelas and criminal gangs operating in them. A few members of Mundo Real’s research team have been conducting ethnographic research in a number of Recife’s more notorious favelas, (e.g. Santo Amaro, Coque, Jordão and Suvaco da Cobra) for over 10 years. These favelas are very intense and dangerous places, with murders occurring every day, although significant progress has been made in the last 4 years. Despite high levels of violence and criminal activity we have never witnessed the kind of heavily armed youth, micro-level warlords and territorialization so common in Rio’s favelas. If official statistics and our ethnographic experience are of any use, then the favelas of Recife are more dangerous than Rio’s favelas, but most of the murders are caused by hand guns, and even knives. Ironically this trend is what has been occurring in Rocinha since the initial ‘pacification’ process began.

Increasingly, the morphology of violence that Rio’s ‘micro-level warlords’ represent is being replaced by paramilitary militias (linked to state security forces) and more recently UPPs. In these settings crime and violence begins to resemble forms found in other intense urban areas throughout the world, where hand guns are responsible for most of the deaths and most criminals carry concealed weapons. The famous weekend baile funk parties in Rocinha are a thing of the past. At these raucous parties dozens of gun toting gangsters would show up around midnight, some on foot others on motorcycles, armed absurdly, often with bullet proof vests, a machine gun in hand, pistols in holsters and grenades strapped across their chests and waists. This is the type of scene that made Rio de Janeiro a truly distinctive urban area and a unique challenge for the police, public security authorities and criminologists. This type of display is still present in dozens of Rio’s favelas. Some of the larger favelas where micro-level warlords still dominate with little resistance are, Antares, Jacarezinho, Manguinhos, Complexo de Acari, Morro da Pedreira, Morro do Dendê, Serrinha, Juramento, and others), but with some of the city’s principal favelas increasingly occupied by police or militias, the territory of Rio’s micro-level warlords is decreasingly steadily.

What is wrong with Rio’s pacification process in Rocinha?

Returning to Rocinha, the 1,500 police officer invasion and occupation that occurred last November happened far too easily, there wasn’t a single shot fired. We are 100% against violence but we are also opposed to political and economically motivated lies. That not one shot was fired alone is barely credible and begs for questioning as to what degree the invasion was a ‘negotiated’ political ploy. Now that the dust has settled and the politicians received their initial fanfare for such a ‘successful’ mega-operation and conquering of enemy territory, the reality and the complexity of power dynamics in communities like Rocinha are becoming more apparent.

We ask, if it was so easy to ‘pacify’ the favelas, with so few shots fired, why has this process taken so long to realize, why was this not done 30 or at least 20 years ago when crime and violence began to spiral out of control in Rio?

We ask, if it was so easy to ‘pacify’ the favelas, with so few shots fired, why has this process taken so long to realize, why was this not done 30 or at least 20 years ago when crime and violence began to spiral out of control in Rio? Indeed, we find it interesting that the apparently rushed (but decades overdue) PAC favela upgrading program and UPP installations coincide closely with the campaigns of Governor Sergio Cabral and Mayor Eduardo Paes (both of the right wing but ideologically vacuous PMDB) in the current era of mega-event driven development in Rio de Janeiro. PAC, Programa de Aceleração de Crescimento, at the local level, has mainly been administered and implemented by Rio’s State Government (SEOBRAS, EMOP, Casa Civil, etc.). The state quickly subcontracted out most of the work to large private sector development contractors that “coincidentally” had previously donated millions to the governor’s PMDB political party and his 2006 campaign. The UPP or Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora, are largely being funded by the federal program Pronasci, Programa Nacional de Segurança Pública com Cidadania, but is administered by Rio’s state government.

Taking a step back, in 2002 Rio won the bid to host the 2007 Pan American Games, the costliest Pan Am Games to date (Gaffney 2010), and this marked a period of substantial shifts in public and private urban development strategies and ideologies. Decision Makers’ wrestled with how to manage potentially risky favelas like Rocinha, situated ‘too close for comfort’. This was particularly so because the Pan Am Games were a litmus test for Rio’s bid to host the 2016 Olympics. In April of 2004 there was a particularly violent shootout in Rocinha that made international headlines, shocking the community and traumatizing the residents of São Conrado, a wealthy neighborhood bordering Rocinha that also pays the city’s highest property taxes. This episode sparked significant civil society activity in Rocinha and São Conrado that has since altered daily life in the community. By late 2007 ‘Rocinha’s development revolution’ was in full swing as certain ‘buzzwords’ (e.g. desenvolvimento,crescimento, participação, inclusão and pacificação) became common. Public investments, civil society organizations, economic activity and media attention greatly increased. Since 2007 new programs and policies have been announced regularly, and within the community’s super dense 0.4 square miles of urban space the full array of development themes can be found.

With all of this development activity taking place the tragic rains of April 2010 could not have come at a worse time for Rio’s favelas. With Rio set to host the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics, powerful elites were merely waiting for excuses to begin an era of renewed discourse on forced evictions of favelas in prime real-estate locations (Soares Gonçalves 2012). Via a “de-politicized” geotechnical discourse the notion of ‘areas of risk’ has been reborn and reinforced, affecting dozens of favelas in Rio de Janeiro including certain sections of Rocinha (i.e. the neighborhood of Laboriaux where Mundo Real is located).
If we look back to 2004, the minister of sports, Agnelo Queiroz, said that “Any wrong move at this point could impede the possibility that Brasil will host the Olympics.” This was in 2004 before the Pan American games. ( Agnelo: quadro de violência pode impedir que Rio seja sede das Olimpíadas de 2012) In special reference to Rocinha, Angelo goes on to say,”Security of the games is one of the main requirements of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the violence of recent conflicts in Favela da Rocinha, in Rio may jeopardize Brazil’s candidacy to host the games.” So in 2004 as well as today we see that it is imperative to control the violence in the favelas or at least appear to be doing so in order to gain international approval to host these games. With these big games on the horizon – now is the time for the politicians to capitalize off of the decisions to install the UPP.
The pacification of Rio’s favelas is much more politically motivated than authorities will ever admit. They have rushed through their operations rather than making essential improvements for the general benefit of favela residents. It is the favela residents who suffer the most in these violent transactions taking place in their communities. Competent community policing and participatory slum upgrading are wonderful objectives, but the current PAC and UPP process steadily appear to be occurring in order to please stakeholders and future visitors to the upcoming games, and other dodgy political economic reason, than for a genuine concern for the welfare, security and inclusion of Rio’s poorest and most vulnerable citizens.

UPPs will never work in communities like Rocinha as long as you have an extremely corrupt police force and high levels of inequality (inter-favela and asfalto as well as intra-favela)

In Mundo Real’s view the UPPs will never work in communities like Rocinha as long as you have an extremely corrupt police force and high levels of inequality (inter-favela and asfalto as well as intra-favela). So is the UPP a good thing? In theory the answer is a resounding yes! The UPP process, mainly funded and guided by PRONASCI, is intellectually influenced by community policing theory and in particular by the theories put into practice in Colombia under the administration of sociologist Hugo Acero Velasquez while he served as Bogota’s Secretary of Public Security. Velazquez stresses the idea that in order for this type of ‘pacification’ process to be successful authorities have to strive to fight internal corruption of the community police as well as investing heavily in socio-economic improvements that will considerably improve conditions in the community. Velazquez posits that “Security is not simply a question for police and judges; it requires the participation of other forces, particularly social development, to be integrally involved in critical areas with high violence and crime.” In Rio, the former chief of the Civil Police, Helio Luz (who appeared throughout the documentary “Noticias de uma Guerra Particular”) recently said, “The police in Rio are much more corrupt than what is portrayed in the films Tropa de Elite and Tropa de Elite II” (http://www.consciencia.net/o-estado-criou-estes-caras-afirma-helio-luz/). With the inadequacies of the PAC program in Rocinha, and with vast amounts of money disappearing and projects unfinished, where does this leave Rio in regards to a more sincere and transparent vision of development and security?

UPPs seem to be functioning somewhat better in smaller favelas like Chapeu Mangueira and Morro da Babilônia. But large favelas like Rocinha require almost an entirely different development and security paradigm. There is no way to ‘pacify’ a city-slum like Rocinha without undertaking the arduous and dangerous task of confronting corruption, the enemy within. No police force, no army, no politician can provide sweeping positive changes in a place like Rio de Janeiro unless they begin the grueling task of battling corruption and thinking about how a peaceful process like the UPP could move forward without being tainted from the start. Battling corruption must also coincide with sweeping changes in socio-economic conditions. Otherwise business will continue as usual, there will always be a long line of disenfranchised young men waiting to enter the criminal world in order to make fast money, and the drug trade and other criminal elements will continue to flourish in favelas – evolving alongside Rio’s changing landscape.

…

The material in this article has been submitted for publication and certain details and findings have been omitted. For more information please contact us

Publications

Public Security and Spatial Justice in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro http://1mundoreal.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Rafael-Soares-Goncalves-Improving-Security-in-Poor-Areas-2011.pdf

UPP e a Economia da Rocinha e do Alemão: Do Choque de Ordem ao de Progresso http://1mundoreal.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/UPP-e-a-Economia-da-Rocinha-e-do-Alem%C3%A3o-Do-Choque-de-Ordem-ao-de-Progresso.pdf

Marcelo Lopes de Souza, Social Movements in the face of Criminal Power, 2009 Marcelo Lopes de Souza, Social Movements in the face of Criminal Power, 2009

Articles:

Hugo Acero Velasquez – “E um erro combater o trafico e esquecer as ruas” http://revistaepoca.globo.com/Revista/Epoca/0,,EMI56325-15223,00.html

Rocinha passa por fase de estabilização, diz especialista http://br.noticias.yahoo.com/rocinha-passa-fase-estabiliza%C3%A7%C3%A3o-diz-especialista-022421648.html

“Es necesario un plan integral y regional para combatir la inseguridad” – La Politica Online http://lapoliticaonline.com/noticias/val/76726/%E2%80%9Ces-necesario-un-plan-integral-y-regional-para-combatir-la-inseguridad.html

Polícia apura morte de Feijão, líder comunitário da Rocinha http://extra.globo.com/casos-de-policia/policia-apura-morte-de-feijao-lider-comunitario-da-rocinha-4417177.html

Agnelo: quadro de violência pode impedir que Rio seja sede das Olimpíadas de 2012 http://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/noticia/2004-04-14/agnelo-quadro-de-violencia-pode-impedir-que-rio-seja-sede-das-olimpiadas-de-2012

Polícia investiga aumento de bocas de fumo na Rocinha. Traficante Canelão está de volta http://extra.globo.com/casos-de-policia/policia-investiga-aumento-de-bocas-de-fumo-na-rocinha-traficante-canelao-esta-de-volta-4337517.html

Here are excerpts from an article in odia about the issue:

“The construction of the Metro line number 4 (which will connect the neighborhoods of Jardim Oceânico, in Barra da Tijuca, to Estação General Osório) could temporarily displace 290 families in Ipanema.Three apartment buildings in the area are in the path of the trains. The state has decided not to enter into a legal dispute with these residents and will cost $ 377 million to state coffers. The new route will require doubling the size of the nearby train station, General Osorio …”

“… The ‘jeitinho’ in Ipanema will cost almost $ 80 million less if the city evicted up three thousand residents in nine districts in the way of the corridor for the Transcarioca (Bar-Galleon) bus line. If the State had chosen to evict the residents of Ipanema, there would be no need to extend the station…”

Foto: Arte O Dia ( the jeitinho curve in dispute )

Original article:
http://odia.ig.com.br/portal/rio/metr%C3%B4-obra-milion%C3%A1ria-para-n%C3%A3o-desalojar-em-%C3%A1rea-nobre-1.419648

The aim is to clear Rocinha – home to over 100,000 people – of the drugs gangs that have dominated there for decades.

The strategy, known as ‘pacification’, begins with a raid by Brazilian elite forces to drive out the gangs.

It is then followed by investment in public services like water, electricity and waste collection and the installation of permanent police stations, inside the favelas.

The strategy has worked well in other smaller favelas where figures indicate that homicide rates have been reduced by half.

But can it work in places like Rocinha where official corruption is widespread and where the lack of trust in the police have marred past attempts to improve the lives of residents?

Nina Robinson reports for Assignment.

Listen / download the the podcast here 

http://1mundoreal.org/audio/favela-pacified.mp3

Story source: http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00p1brr

Anderson and his family does not want to leave Rocinha, but the increase in the cost of living has changed their plans

The occupation of Rocinha by security forces has put the community in focus. Conveniently located in the south zone of Rio de Janeiro, close to the beach and overlooking the ocean, peace should be cause for celebration for the residents, but instead it has brought a side effect difficult to control: the rising cost of living that has caused a “migratory exodus” in the slum that was once considered the largest in Latin America.

This new reality has hit the family of Anderson Luiz Ferreira da Silva, 35. Since the occupation in November of 2011, the rent has increased by 16.5% and the landlord has warned: the value of property will only go up.

- I do not want to leave, but if things continue this way, I will not have a choice.

Anderson is a chef, but is currently not working because his place of employment is undergoing renovations. He and his wife Andressa Souza Carvalho and two sons, Nicholas and Victoria live in a house with a kitchen, living room and bathroom. After the occupation the rent not only the rent went up but the family also had to pay a higher electricity bill forcing them to change their habits.

- We gave up using the air-conditioning. We have the ac unit, but the bill is too expensive. In the first month, we paid $ 11. In early February, the bill came to $ 50. At that point it was too much to handle.

Anderson said his family is not the one that is struggling. One of his neighbors has moved to Fluminense and another resident living in the same building is planning to do the same.

Anderson recalls five years ago living in the lower part of Rocinha, considered a very desirable area of ​​the community, where he only paid $300 for rent in a two-bedroom house, but he always had problems in this house such as lack of water. In search of a more affordable price, he moved to an apartment in an area known as Cesario, next to the street, in an area further up the hill in the community. Despite his move he couldn’t escape the price increase.

- I came up here just to pay less, but now I’m paying the same amount I did five years ago in a much smaller apartment.
According to the property manager Jorge Ricardo Souza dos Santos, 35, known as Kadinho, these cases are not isolated. Despite the high demand for housing in Rocinha residents leave every day for financial reasons.
- Rocinha has always had expensive rent, but after the police occupation, there has been more disclosure regarding property value. Now rent has increased and the options of affordable houses are decreasing. I’m seeing a lot of people even returning to the Northeast. Every day there are about five or six moving trucks on my street. Rocinha is getting more expensive in a market that that was already expensive.

Rocinha: rent up to $ 1,200

Before the police entered in November of last year, renting a one bedroom piece of property in the lower part of Rocinha cost $ 400. Today the average is $ 600. A year ago, living in a two-bedroom house in Rocinha would cost $ 600 per month, but now the figure can easily reach $ 1,000. In the case of finished houses with at least three bedrooms, the rent reaches up to $ 1,200. The average increase has been $ 200, or about 30% of the minimum wage.
Professor Ricardo Ismael, Department of Sociology and Politics at PUC-Rio Catholic University, notes that this phenomenon not only affects that of Rocinha. In 2011, he did research on the living situation in the favela Parque da Cidade in the neighborhood of Gavea, Rocinha’s neighbor. According to the survey, the community, which has about 10,000 residents, averaged rent at about $ 600 a month and the study found that the rent was increasing.

- We noticed that people who were renting found it difficult to pay their bills and had to start looking for alternatives.
Ismael points out that the value of real estate affects even those who live in the surrounding slums, especially in the south zone of the city, which has gone through the process of pacification. However, he acknowledges that these effects are felt most in the communities where workers earn salaries.
- There is a very high valuation of real estate, which is going far beyond the increase received by workers living on the minimum wage.

Original Article from Isabele Rangel, do R7 | 03/03/2012 às 16h40:

http://noticias.r7.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticias/rocinha-fica-mais-cara-e-expulsa-moradores-20120303.html

Laboriaux, francisco horta, DP fev, 2012

On February 7^th eleven residents of Laboriaux participated in an important meeting/reading with Dr. Francisco Horta Filho to study the Municipal DECREE (DECRETO) N°34522, published on the 3^rd of OCTOBER of 2011. Francisco Horta Filho is the new coordenador of the Núcleo de Terras e Habitação (Nuth), or the Nucleus for Land and Housing, of the Defensoria Pública do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (Rio de Janeiro State Public Defender’s Office). The DECREE, signed by Mayor Eduardo Paes is an improvement from the past practices, which causes widespread atrocities (arbitrary forced evictions and persistent threats of forced evictions).After careful reading with Dr. Francisco, however, it became apparent that the document is more complicated than the average (anyone who isn’t an attorney in Rio) person is likely to understand.

The official DECREE – which is four pages long and has 9 pages of complex attachments – addresses fundamental procedures that must be followed in cases of forced eviction, demolitions and the removal of residents of impoverished communities.

All of the procedures/laws stated in the decree already exist in Brazilians Federal, State and Municipal laws, but the majority had been ignored or brushed aside by Paes and his administration since they began their steadfast war against Rio’s working poor and their communities in 2009/2010. Eduardo Paes was very hesitant to sign this DECREE because he knew that doing so would be like shooting his own foot. If it is widely distributed it would make it more difficult for him to continue past practices. He only signed it under intense pressure from organized residents of threatened favelas, like Laboriaux, Estradinha, and Vila Autódromo, and from Nuth. At the meeting we read the entire document and offered our advice, after Dr. Francisco provided his while also explaining the difficult and esoteric legal jargon.

It turns out that while the DECREE lays out regulations, that if followed would be an improvement from what favela residents have been facing, through calculated selection of wording it leaves many dangerous possibilities open. We made dozens of recommendations and that will be presented to the City in March of 2012. If our recommendations are taken seriously then the DECREE will prove to be a truly powerful and beneficial tool for all vulnerable residents of Rio de Janeiro living in threatened communities. It will be important that as many favela residents as possible have a copy of the DECREE, the way it stands now and the way we hope it will stand later this year. If our suggestions are not considered then we will enter into legal proceedings against the City. We already began distributing the DECREE in Laboriaux, having pass out more than 100 copies (which is about 1000 pages with all the attachments).

823 families (or roughly 3,200 residents) of Laboriaux will soon receive property titles and deeds to their homes and businesses.

It looks like Laboriaux’s and Mundo Real’s persistent pressure is starting to change the scenario here. We received a copy of an Official Bulletin from the City’s Secretary of Housing stating that 823 families (or roughly 3,200 residents) of Laboriaux will soon receive property titles and deeds to their homes and businesses. It this is true it will be a tremendous victory for a community that was doomed to forced eviction less than 2 years ago. Indeed the engineer (GEO-RIO) responsible for the major projects currently taking place here told us a year ago that the entire area would be razed, but if we could make enough noise then it would be possible to could change this outcome. Looks like our persistence may have proved essential, and we will keep posting information as events unfold.

http://backstory.blogs.cnn.com/2011/12/07/comparing-the-good-and-the-bad-living-in-the-favela-rocinha/

There are many corrupt and dangerous leaders in Rocinha who need to be investigated and imprisoned. If not, it is undeniable that much of PAC 2 money will be stolen and diverted just as was the case with PAC 1.

Many on the right (the conservatives) argue that favelas are a result of people’s laziness, addictive personalities, natural inclination to violence and a pervasive ‘culture of poverty’ that exist in slums and ghettos. This is the approach that often ‘blames the victims’ for their problems. Many on the left (the progressives) argue that social problems in communities like Rocinha are a result of external oppression, caused by the politics and economics of powerful elites who have constructed a social structure that benefits them at the expense of the working classes and poor. A more integrated approach would try to combine some of these theories. Mundo Real undoubtedly sides much more with those on the left. Another factor that is usually omitted from grand theories on poverty and inequality is the enormous role that local level violence and corruption play in favela communities. Removing the ‘armed’ drug traffickers was the easy task for the state to accomplish, removing the highly corrupt local level politicians, businesses, and ‘community leaders’ is going to be much harder. On Friday the 2^nd this process began, but there are dozens of others, some much more corrupt and dangerous, who need to be investigated and imprisoned as well. If not, it is undeniable that much of PAC 2 money will be stolen and diverted just as was the case with PAC 1.

Many large NGOs in Rio, including the some of the most famous ones, have been mysteriously silent since the City began its mass eviction campaign in April of 2010.

Bento Rubião has gained its fair share of critics for partnering with the City. The majority of these critiques assert that it is the City that is actively trying to evict thousands of low income resident’s in Rio de Janeiro. Some believe that the City will succeed in co-opting FBR. The City has been accused of doing so with many other NGOs that receive their funding. For example, many large NGOs in Rio, including the some of the most famous ones, have been mysteriously silent since the City began its mass eviction campaign in April of 2010. Many believe this is because they are apprehensive of losing their funding, which is entirely possible, if they were to challenge the entity that pays their salaries and activities. This is why activists are concerned that FBR will follow the same path and be coerced into playing into the hands of the City’s conservative agenda.

While anything is possible, I don’t think this will happen. FBR has a history of being loyal to the communities and residents they work for. Also, they included a clause in their bidding proposal that clearly indicates the City may not attempt to interfere in their work or the contract will be dissolved. This doesn’t necessarily mean too much in a city like Rio where official decrees and laws are regularly broken, but it is something to consider. Also, as one longtime employee of FBR, who also lives and works in Rocinha, told Mundo Real, “if it was not FBR that won this bidding, it would have been another NGO and at least this way we are on the inside and will know most of what the City is planning in regards to evictions and housing.”

The event was planned to establish guidelines and proposals for the creation of housing in the city of Rio de Janeiro. The objective was to discuss alternatives for the creation of housing in the social interest as well as new management models. Without a serious housing plan or policy – major problems will continue to occur in Rio. Laboriaux is a perfect example of what can happen when a city has no effective housing policy. Laboriaux was officially created by the City of Rio de Janeiro (and to a lesser degree by the state of Rio) in 1982 when 73 families were removed from the bottom of Rocinha and resettled in area of Laboriaux. These 73 families were provided housing alongside the also newly built road, Rua Maria do Carmo. Roughly 400 people lived in Laboriaux by the end of 1982.  With no housing plan in place the city and state virtually forgot about Laboriaux. Obviously the population of Laboriaux increased and so did haphazard construction, but the authorities were not present to regulate this growth, they simply allowed the area to expand rapidly. By the early 2000s Laboriaux’s population was already over 3000 and growing and there were houses with three and in some cases four stories. Now the houses in Laboriaux could be seen from Lagoa and elsewhere in Rio’s affluent Zona Sul and this began to gravely concern some powerful people. The rains of April 2010 provided the perfect opportunity for the City and Rio’s power elite to push for the complete eviction of Laboriaux, with no plan in place as to where to send the evicted residents. This mess and countless others across the city could be largely avoided if there was a serious and fair housing policy in place.

These evictions across the city could be largely avoided if there was a serious and fair housing policy in place.

So far these meetings between the City and FBR have not had significant popular participation. This three day event was no different. If the popular participation does not increase then there will likely be problems ahead. So far these meetings have been largely dominated by technocrats and NGOs. This needs to change if a serious housing plan and policy is to be arrived at.

Rocinha sem Fronteirs - 26 of November 2011

On Saturday the 26^th of November the community-based organization, Rocinha sem Fronteiras (Rocinha without Borders) held their monthly meeting which always fall on the third Saturday of every month. There were roughly 20 people present. The theme of the gathering was Rocinha’s PEU or Projeto de Estruturação Urbana (Urban Structuring project). The guest speaker was Rogerio, who is finishing his PhD in urban planning at UFRJ and who in the past also worked with Toledo. Rogerio’s research is centered on Rio’s PEUs. He admitted that Rocinha is the first favela community he has even focused on that is trying to implement a PEU. Most PEUs are implemented in the ‘formal city.’ For example, there is one for Botafogo, nine in the neighborhood of Madureira and one for São Cristovão. The idea (a law actually) is relatively new, it began in 1977 and many of Rio’s neighborhoods do not yet have a PEU. Some elite neighborhoods are also trying to establish their PEUs, including Rocinha’s wealthy neighbor, São Conrado, which is trying to include in their PEU a section that would transform Estrada da Gávea, Rocinha’s main road, into a business district. Exactly what this would mean for the tens of thousands of residents who live adjacent to Estrada da Gávea is yet to be know. Rogerio mentioned that a PEU a law that in theory must be followed, unlike a Master Plan. While it was easy for the state to alter Toledo’s Master Plan it would be considerably more difficult to alter a PEU for Rocinha, which is one reason Toledo is also adamant Rocinha getting its PEU implemented.

The teleférico is increasing a divisive issue…. According to Toledo it will use up approximately 70% of the 750 million set aside for PAC 2 and it will do very little to better the quality of life for Rocinha’s residents.

It didn’t take long for the discussion of Rocinha’s PEU to turn to the hot topic of the moment, the state’s proposed teleférico (cable car) in Rocinha. The teleférico is increasing a divisive issue. Most activists in Rocinha are against the plan, but there is a small segment that is trying to convince residents that it is a good idea. These pro-teleférico residents are pretty much the same people who always gain from mega-projects in Rocinha. They are part of a highly powerful group of 30 to 40 people at the most who are constantly meddling in development projects and seeking ways to make money at the expense of Rocinha’s masses. Rocinha has long been a money making machine for people with little scruples – whether they are drug traffickers, gambling bosses, dubious NGOs, shady businesses, or corrupt politicians. For honest workers life in Rocinha and in Rio de Janeiro is very difficult, and the lure of ‘hustling’ is strong in communities like Rocinha. A few dozen of Rocinha’s residents have profited tremendously out of development projects like PAC. Literally millions were stolen and misused from PAC 1 and the teleférico, part of PAC 2, will certainly be another way corrupt ‘leaders’ will make money, because they will do their best (including coercion, intimidation and violence) to make sure that the corrupt outsiders (external politicians and corporations) make even more money here.

Rocinha has long been a money making machine for people with little scruples – whether they are drug traffickers, gambling bosses, dubious NGOs, shady businesses, or corrupt politicians.

Mundo Real is openly against the idea of building a teleférico in Rocinha. According to Toledo it will use up about 70% of the 750 million set aside for PAC 2 and it will do very little to better the quality of life for Rocinha’s residents. The Rocinha sem Fronteiras meeting was supposed to focus on Rogerio and a discussion of Rocinha’s PEU, but much like this posting the meeting was diverted by the contentious issue of the teleférico. In all fairness the teleférico is highly related to Rocinha’s PEU, and it is a part of the Urban Structuring Project that most of Rocinha’s sincere activists against.

On Saturday November 26^th there was a conference hosted by the Community Board of Rocinha, São Conrado and Gávea. The event was held at the Ayrton Senna public school, located on the São Conrado side of the new pedestrian bridge at the foot of Rocinha. The Community Board (Câmara Comuitaria) of Rocinha, São Conrado and Gávea has been described in previous posting, but it is essentially a civil society group that meets on issues concerning these three neighborhoods. Members of the Community Board participate in one (or possible more than one) of the nine thematic groups. The conference on Saturday had a very specific goal — to agree upon three priorities from each of the nine thematic groups (henceforth GT, from the Portuguese Grupos Temáticos). The nine GTs are:

1. Urbanism & Environment
2. Health and Education
3. Sports and Leisure
4. Work and Income
5. Tourism
6. Communication
7. Culture
8. Human Rights
9. Youth.

On Saturday I participated in the Urbanism & Environment GT because I have been part of this group since it was established earlier in 2011. All the GTs are important, but for many of the issues Mundo Real engagement with the Urbanism & Environment GT is of particular significance because it addresses issues related to PAC 1 and PAC 2, Rocinha’s infrastructure, forced evictions, housing and other themes related to urban planning and development in Rocinha. Ruth Jurberg also participated in the Urbanism & Environment GT. Ruth is from the Canteiro Social do PAC which is basically the social services project of PAC. She has held this position, which is under the auspice of the state government’s Casa Civil since 2007. As head of PAC’s Canterio Social she is responsible for social projects in the communities of Rocinha, Complexo do Alemão and Manguinhos.

The increasing attention from outside Rocinha is becoming an issue that has some community residents and activists on guard…

There were about 140 people at the conference, of which approximately 30% were from Rocinha. The increasing attention from outside Rocinha is becoming an issue that has some community residents and activists on guard, because before the UPP process began the Community Board meetings were small and roughly 95% comprised of Rocinha’s residents. The newfound attention is in many ways positive for a community that has long been neglected. The totalitarian regime that existed here before November 13^th made it very difficult (or impossible) for certain entities to operate in Rocinha. While some new faces are certainly welcomed the thing to be wary of is that with this new attention (and speculation) there are also many wolves in sheep’s clothing, hoping to profit off of the ‘new Rocinha.’

There were 25 participants in the Urbanism & Environment GT. During the 1 hour and 20 minutes that we were split up into GTs several important issues were raised. As usual I mentioned the evictions in Laboriaux and was pleased that we discussed this theme for some time. In the end it was added to the list of priorities but did not make the top three. Regarding Laboriaux, Ruth advised residents to seek clarification from the City because according to her it is the municipal government of Rio de Janeiro that is responsible for Laboriaux’s fate, not the state government. While this is ‘technically true’ the issue is more complex and the state does have the power to intervene. Nonetheless, Seu Martins and I arranged a meeting with the UPP Social’s local administrator, Eduardo Alencar, after the meeting, to discuss the situation in Laboriaux. It is important to note that while the UPP Social originated as a state government program it was passed on to the City about 18 months ago. We have arranged a meeting with the UPP Social in Laboriaux for the week of December 5^th.

The absolute rejection … of the plan to spend R$500 million ($300 million) to build a teleférico in Rocinha

Again, housing in Laboriaux is an issue I wanted to see make the top three priorities, but Rocinha is an enormous community with many complex issues that also need to be addressed. Also, other residents from Laboriaux who were present raised the issue in their respective GTs, and one of them, Ricardo, succeeded in getting us into the top three.

The top three priorities agreed upon in the Urbanism & Environment GT were:

1. answers regarding when PAC 1 will be completed and when PAC 2 will begin,
2. The absolute rejection, with the exception of Ruth Jurberg who was in favor, of the plan to spend R$500 million ($300 million) building a teleférico in Rocinha and
3. clarification on the status of the Parque Ecológico da Rocinha (Rocinha’s Eco Park). Essentially, all of these issues were addressed to Ruth Jurberg.

Ruth jurberg speaking at the camara comunitaria, 26 de nov 2011

In this sense we were lucky to have her in our group because she helped narrowing down doubts and priorities. Ruth, in theory, serves the deliberative function of delivering the boards suggestions to the appropriate state (and possibly municipal and federal) legislative representatives and assemblies. Ruth made it clear that PAC 2 can only begin after PAC 1 has been completely finished. This is frustrating because PAC 1 went almost 40% over budget and left about 35% of the proposed designs unfinished. The money ‘mysteriously’ disappeared and the work was left incomplete. Now the state government has asked for an additional R$50 million ($30 million) to finish PAC 1. One participant interjected, ‘I saw with my own eyes on countless occasions, trucks that were supposed to be delivering PAC 1 material being heading to areas of Rocinha and outside of Rocinha that they had no business being in.’ Ruth promised this issue would be investigated. Another point raised several times was that of the chic soccer pitch that was built with PAC 1 money. Everyone knows this concrete pitch and the related amenities around it were built for Rocinha’s drug traffickers to play soccer on and to party afterwards. Not only did they divert hundreds of thousands of dollars to build it they also deforested a federally protect area of Tijuca National Forest to do so. This is a prime example of how local level corruption interferes in ‘development’ programs in communities like Rocinha. Ruth claimed to not know about the expensive soccer pitch. Ruth added that PAC 2 had already begun in the Canto Galo community and estimated that it would be another year before it could begin in Rocinha.

After the GT meetings we return to the general assembly room and each GT presented their lists of priorities. Ruth did not stay for this part of the conference, to the dismay of many who did. Ricardo, a long time resident of Laboriaux, managed to get the critical issue of Public School Abelardo Chacrinha Barbosa (the elementary school in Laboriaux that served over 300 kids and which was closed for no valid reason in Abril of 2010) in the top three priorities of the Education and Health GT. We will make the list of top priorities available soon.

In short, the Community Board was born out of the PAC 1 Canteiro Social. It serves as an important space in which issues that are pertinent to Rocinha, São Conrado and Gávea are raised. It is by no means the only way to do so. The interesting thing, however, is that there has been a tremendous amount of interest in all things ‘Rocinha’ since the UPP process began on the 13^thof November. The Community Board meetings were small and almost solely Rocinha before. Now they are growing and attracting plenty of outside attention. While this may be good on the one hand, on the other it appears that hordes of people, businesses, NGOs and other entities that have long wanted a slice of the Rocinha pie are trying to get their grab at it now that the UPP process is offering them a chance. Rocinha has become like some kind of favela gold rush, where everyone is trying to make a name or get rich quick. Before the plunder went almost exclusively to the drug traffickers, corrupt politicians and businessmen and a few other underworld groups — now apparently any one can make it big in the slum.